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I study a game in which ¯rms ¯rst bid on wildcat tracts and then time their drilling
decisions. In an equilibrium bids are used as a coordination device: if player i bid low while
player ¡i bid high, player i waits while player ¡i drills. This equilibrium is consistent with
the empirical ¯ndings of Hendricks and Porter (1996). Firms know that by bidding \low"
they can be allocated the right to free-ride. This induces \optimistic" ¯rms to submit \low"
bids. Nonetheless, this equilibrium need not reduce expected revenues as compared to the
benchmark case in which one abstracts from signalling issues.
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11 Introduction
Over the last year the price of oil has peaked. This has dented consumers' purchasing power,
increased in°ationary pressures and forced the world's central bankers into a delicate balancing
exercise. To bring the price of oil to more acceptable levels, more e®ort and money should be
devoted to ¯nding new deposits. Oil exploration programs are often initiated by private ¯rms
which acquired the right to explore and extract oil (and gas) after participating in an auction.
In recent years Algeria, Brazil, Cuba, Ecuador, India, Indonesia, Libya, Nigeria, Peru, Russia,
Uganda, the US and Venezuela have put part of their oil and gas reserves under the hammer.
This list of countries is set to increase in the future. Greenland and Pakistan, for example, have
recently decided to organize future oil and gas auctions. Those auctions often generate huge
revenues and secure the supply of crucial energy resources.1
To increase our understanding of how ¯rms bid during those auctions, I analyze bidding
behavior in outer continental shelf (OCS) wildcat auctions that were (and still are) organized
by the department of the interior of the US. Those auctions are interesting to study for two
di®erent reasons. First, they started in 1954 and a lot of bidding and drilling data is available
about them. This allows me to check whether the existing evidence conforms with theoretical
predictions. Second, bidding strategies in those auctions feature trade-o®s that have not yet been
analyzed. To illustrate this second point, I next explain some institutional features which are
most relevant for understanding the game I will study and which motivate some of my modelling
assumptions.
1.1 Some institutional features
In this paper I focus on wildcat tracts. Such a tract is situated in an o®shore geographical area
where no exploratory drilling has occurred in the past. Tracts that are situated next to already
developed ones are called drainage tracts. Hendricks and Porter (1988) showed that ¯rms possess
an informational advantage over the value of a neighboring tract. In contrast, no ¯rm should
possess superior information about the value of a wildcat tract.
At the start of the auction process, ¯rms express their desire to drill in some geographical area
of the outer continental shelf. The US government then organizes an auction in which a huge
number of tracts (situated in the desired area) are simultaneously o®ered for sale. A tract covers
an area not exceeding 5,760 acres (§23:3km2). Firms then bid on a small subset of the tracts
o®ered for sale. For example, between 1998 and 2005 (inclusive) the US government organized
1For example, between 1954 and 2004 the US Government collected around 159 billion dollars solely form auc-
tioning o® their o®shore oil and gas tracts (Source: www.mms.gov/ld/PDFs/GreenBook-LeasingDocument.pdf).
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Figure 1: Solo Bidding in OCS Auctions
22 such auctions. On average 3,145 tracts were o®ered in each one of them.2 On average only
305 of them received at least one bid.3 Hence, in those auctions the number of tracts o®ered for
sale by far exceeds total demand. As a result of this, few of the tracts o®ered for sale receive
more than one bid. To illustrate this point consider Figure 1. The Figure reveals that between
1998 and 2005 (inclusive), Pr(tract i receives only one bidjtract i receives at least one bid) always
exceeded 74%.4
Firms submit a bid for each tract they are interested in acquiring. A bid is a dollar ¯gure
that the ¯rm has to pay if she wins the tract. Firms submit their bids simultaneously. If a tract
happens to possess only one bid then the US government decides whether or not to reject the bid.
To do so, it estimates the \fair market value" of the tract. Henceforth, this fair-market-value
estimate will be called the (government's) reservation price. A tract which received only one
bid is sold if the bid exceeds the reservation price. The reservation price is computed after all
bids were submitted. It may depend on rivals' bids (on other tracts) as well as on information
2Observe, however, that not all those 3,145 tracts were wildcat ones. Some tracts were drainage tracts. Some
tracts may have been re-o®ered for sale as the past owner of the tract let his lease expire without drilling any well
(those ones are called development tracts).
3Source: own computations based on data taken from http://www.mms.gov/econ/EconDiv.htm.
4Solo bidding, however, has not always been the norm in OCS auctions. In particular, Hendricks, Porter
and Boudreau (1987) documented that Pr(tract i receives only one bidjtract i receives at least one bid) was
approximately 32% for wildcat auctions held during the period 1954-1969.
3that only became public after the auction took place. Hence, ex-ante bidders don't know what
the realization of the reservation price will be. This insight, combined with my earlier ¯nding
that few tracts receive more than one bid, indicate that a player's bidding strategy is primarily
determined by her desire to \beat" the reservation price rather than to \beat" a hypothetical
competing bid. So far, only Hendricks, Porter and Spady (HPS, 1989) analyzed the government's
rejection decision on o®shore tracts. They focussed on drainage and development tracts that
were sold during the period 1959 - 1979. Unfortunately, wildcat tracts were not included in their
sample. They found that the rejection decision on drainage tracts was positively correlated with
a tract's size, with the average wellhead price of o®shore oil and with the identity of the highest
bidder (i.e. the government was more likely to reject a given high bid submitted by a neighbor
¯rm than by a non-neighbor one). The rejection decision was also negatively correlated with
the value of the highest bid. The decision, however, was not signi¯cantly correlated with the
amount of oil extracted nor with the bidding history of the neighboring tract. As the reservation
price on drainage tracts did not depend on the expected quantity of oil, there is no reason to
assume that the contrary situation would prevail on wildcat tracts (where no oil from neighboring
tracts was ever extracted). After ¯rms submitted their bids, but before the ¯rst drilling date,
the government releases the identity of all bidders along with their bids.
After winning her tract, a ¯rm is given ¯ve years to initiate an exploratory drilling program.
If after ¯ve years she has not drilled her tract, her lease expires and the tract is returned to the
government which may decide to resell it in some future auction. The tracts are usually smaller
than the size of the deposits. For example, Lin (2007) documents that the largest petroleum ¯eld
in the Gulf of Mexico spans 23 tracts. Depending on water depth, 57% to 67% of all productive
tracts had to share their deposits with at least one neighboring ¯rm. Furthermore the costs of
drilling an exploratory well are not trivial. According to Zampelli (2000) in 1996 the average
exploratory well had a depth of 11,203 feet (3,414 meters) and cost 3.3 million USD. This cost
dramatically increases with well depth: A 15,000 feet (4,572 meters) exploratory well cost 10
million USD.
Given those facts, one would expect ¯rms to play a waiting game, i.e. a ¯rm has an incentive
to postpone her exploratory drilling in the hope that her neighbor drills ¯rst. This plausible
strategic behavior is not inconsistent with the available empirical evidence. Hendricks and Porter
(1996)5 documented that the hazard rate of drilling (i.e. the probability to drill at time t given
that the tract has not been drilled before) features a U-shaped pattern. A tract is most likely to
be drilled at the start or at the end of her lease term. In years 2, 3 and 4, however, the hazard
5Henceforth, HP will be used instead of Hendricks and Porter (1996).
4rate is signi¯cantly lower. If a ¯rm drills her tract during the ¯nal year of her lease, this indicates
that she must hold su±ciently optimistic beliefs about her prospects of ¯nding oil. The fact that
she postponed her drilling decision indicates that there was a positive option value of waiting.
A plausible explanation behind this option value of waiting is that the ¯rm hoped to learn from
her neighbor's drilling outcomes. Furthermore, HP also found that the probability to drill during
the second and the third year of the lease term is positively in°uenced by the number of past
successful drilling outcomes.
1.2 Summary of my results and relation to the literature
Studying strategic behavior in this context is thus a delicate matter as players behave strategically
both during as after the auction.6 To analyze the interaction between bidding and drilling I
develop the following two-stage game: In the ¯rst stage player one bids on tract one while player
two bids on tract two. Both players choose their bids to \beat" the random reservation price.
The higher a player's bid, the higher the probability that her bid will exceed the reservation
price. In case both players won their tracts, they play a waiting game to determine who will drill
¯rst. Prior to the waiting game, but after the bidding stage, the seller discloses bids. I focus on
the class of the strongly symmetric strategies. To understand this class, observe that | typically
| the waiting game is characterized by three di®erent continuation equilibria. In the ¯rst one,
player one drills while player two waits. In the second one, player two drills while player one
waits. Finally, in the third one both players play a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. Bluntly
stated, a strongly symmetric strategy is a symmetric strategy with the added restriction that if
the two players possess the same posterior at the start of the waiting game, they focus on the
mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. This class of strategies describes best the existing empirical
evidence (see HP for a detailed defense of this class of strategies in this context). See also Section
3 for a discussion on how my model ¯ts the existing empirical evidence.
In section 2, I analyze equilibrium behavior. I ¯rst show that there exist equilibria in which an
optimist (i.e. a player who possesses favorable private information) bids \high" (with probability
one) as she wants to secure the purchase of the tract. A pessimist (i.e. a player who possesses
unfavorable private information) faces the following trade-o®: If she bids \low" she might buy her
tract \cheaply" but her low bid also makes her neighbor less \optimistic". This, in turn, reduces
the probability that her neighbor will drill (and thus hampers her free-riding opportunities).
6Milgrom and Weber (1982) and Hendricks, Porter and Tan (2007) have developed models that shed some
light on how players bid in those auctions. Ausubel, Cramton and Milgrom (2006) argue that a clock-proxy
auction may be the most adequate auction format in this setting. Those three papers, however, do not study the
interaction between bidding and drilling.
5Depending on the values of the parameters she either prefers to bid \high" (in which case there
exists a pooling or a semi-separating equilibrium) or she prefers to bid \low" (in which case there
exists a separating equilibrium). Next, I also show that there exists a semi-separating equilibrium
in which pessimists bid low (with probability one), while optimists with some probability bid as if
they have bad private information. To understand the intuition behind this equilibrium, suppose
player 1 bid \high" while player 2 bid \low". Suppose both players won their tracts. As a low bid
may have been submitted both by an optimist and by a pessimist, both players do not possess
the same posterior at time one. Hence, they do not have to drill with the same probability.
I then assume that both players focus on a continuation equilibrium in which player 1 drills
while player 2 waits. Hence, in this equilibrium an optimist faces the following trade-o®: If
she bids \low", she reduces her probability of winning the tract. Conditional upon winning,
however, she increases the probability that she will free-ride on her neighbor's drilling cost. In
equilibrium the probability with which an optimist bids low is chosen to balance its advantage
with its disadvantage. Finally, I provide su±cient conditions for uniqueness within the class of
the strongly symmetric strategies.
In section 3, I argue that the semi-separating equilibrium in which optimists randomize be-
tween bidding low and bidding high, explains best the existing empirical evidence. I also contrast
my explanation with the one provided by HP. In section 4, I compare expected revenues if players
focus on the semi-separating equilibrium (in which optimists randomize between bidding low and
bidding high) with the ones if players were to focus on the separating equilibrium instead. I show
that in the semi-separating equilibrium pessimists bid more aggressively than in the separating
one. This is intuitive: a pessimist knows that her neighbor is more likely to drill in the former
equilibrium. This increases her valuation of the tract (and thus also her bid). I show that the
increase in the pessimist's bid may exceed the expected reduction in the optimist's bid. Hence,
the semi-separating equilibrium (in which optimists with some probability bid low) increases
e±ciency (as it increases the ex ante probability of sequential drilling) and need not result in a
reduction in expected revenues.
This is not the ¯rst paper to analyze an auction as part of a larger market interaction.
Haile (2000), considers a game in which players can resell after the auction took place. Jehiel
and Moldovanu (2000) and Goeree (2003) analyze an auction followed by some downstream
interaction among all players. In contrast to this paper, downstream interaction is not modelled
explicitly. Instead they take a reduced-form approach in which player i's payo® depends on
the outcome of the auction.7 Das varma (2003) models post-auction (Betrand and Cournot)
7In Goeree a player's payo® depends (i) on whether she won the object or not, (ii) on her true type and (iii)
6competition explicitly and obtains essentially the same results as Goeree (2003). Arozamena and
cantillon (2004) analyze incentives to invest in a cost reducing technology prior to a procurement
auction. Burguet and McAfee (2005) analyze a model with budget constrained bidders and
in which the auction stage is also followed by Cournot competition. Haile, Goeree and Das
Varma ¯nd that | in the presence of post-auction interaction | it becomes harder to obtain a
separating equilibrium because of signaling considerations at the bidding stage. In contrast to
my paper, all three papers restrict attention to separating equilibria. Furthermore, Jehiel and
Moldovanu and Goeree assume that the payo® function is di®erentiable in players' types (or in
a player's perceived type). This assumption seems reasonable if one thinks of either Cournot or
Bertrand competition as the (implicit) post-auction interaction. In this paper, however, after
the auction players engage in a battle-of-the-sexes game which typically possesses three di®erent
equilibria. I then show that, even if one restricts attention to the class of the strongly symmetric
strategies, bids may select a continuation equilibrium in which one player waits while the other
one drills. Hence, depending on the selected equilibrium, my payo® function is not continuous in
bids: If player i bids below a certain threshold (and wins her tract), her payo® jumps upwards.
Finally, Avery (1998) studies an English auction in which players \jump bid" to signal that their
valuations lie above some threshold level and to select an asymmetric continuation equilibrium.
I show that bidders in OCS auctions behave similarly: In one semi-separating equilibrium a low
bid (partly) signals a low valuation and selects an equilibrium in which the high bidder drills
while the low bidder waits.
2 The Model
2.1 The general set-up
Two risk-neutral players are interested in acquiring one of two adjacent o®shore tracts. The
seller o®ers them in two simultaneous ¯rst price auctions. Each of the players bid in one of
the two auctions.8 The value of both tracts depends on the realized state of the world. In
on her perceived type in the post-auction game. Jehiel and Moldovanu consider a two-player set-up in which the
payo® from not winning the object depends on both players' types (the winning bidder's payo® only depends on
her type). They also assume that a player's type becomes common knowledge after the auction.
8Implicitly, I am making two assumptions here. First, I assume that bidders have unit demand. Second, I
assume that there is only one bidder per tract. The ¯rst assumption can be defended on the grounds that ¯rms
may not want to bid on all the tracts o®ered for sale (remind that in the period 1998 ¡ 2005 on average 3;145
tracts were simultaneously o®ered for sale!) either because of bidding constraints, or because of a bottleneck in
the supply of drilling rigs or because of risk-aversion. None of those reasons, however, are explicitly modeled here.
7particular, I assume that the state of the world is either high (H) or low (L). If the state of
the world is high (low), then the value of the oil (underneath both tracts) is equal to one (zero).
The probability that the state of the world is high is equal to 1
2. The reservation price of the
seller, r » U[0;1].9 Both tracts possess the same reservation price. Both players possesses an
informative, but imperfect signal concerning the realized state of the world. Formally, if the
state of the world is H, a player receives signal h with probability p 2 (1
2;1), and signal l with
probability (1 ¡ p). Similarly, if the state of the world is L, a player receives signal h with
probability (1 ¡ p), and signal l with probability p. Signals are (conditionally) independent. I
denote the common drilling cost by c. A tract is called marginal if 1
2 < c < p. A tracts is called
non-marginal if 1 ¡ p < c < 1
2.
After players submitted their bids, but before players decide to drill or not the seller (gov-
ernment) discloses both player's bids. Players discount the future at a rate ± < 1. I assume
that
Assumption 1 1 ¡ p < c < p.
The assumption implies that a player who received signal h is - a priori - willing to drill
(Pr(Hjh) = p > c), and that a player who received a signal l is a priori not willing to drill
(Pr(Hjl) = 1 ¡ p < c). Henceforth, I call a player who received a high (low) signal an optimist
(pessimist).10 I consider the following sequencing of events:
-1 Nature draws the state of the world, the reservation price and players receive their signals.
Next, because of the information externality, a ¯rm's valuation of a particular tract is nondecreasing in the number
of neighboring tracts she wins in the auction. Remind, however, that I study how the information externality
at the drilling stage a®ects bidding behavior (and vice versa). Introducing supermodular utility functions in the
analysis would therefore unnecessarily complicate matters. The second assumption is consistent with the recent
US experience as shown in Figure 1. Moreover, my main result (that bids are used as a coordination device)
should not hinge on this assumption.
9This assumption can best be understood as follows: suppose the quantity of oil (underneath both tracts),
Q 2 f0;1g. The (nominal) value of the oil is equal to PQ, where P denotes the price of oil. Hence, the real
value of the oil is either equal to zero or equal to one. Furthermore, suppose the (nominal) reservation price,
R = f(P) + ², where ² » U[²;¹ ²] and where f denotes an arbitrary function. This is consistent with the empirical
¯ndings of HPS which showed that the government's rejection decision was not correlated with any variable other
than (i) the tract size, (ii) the winning bid, (iii) the identity of the winning bidder and (iv) the price of oil. In
my model both tracts have the same size and both bidders do not own a neighboring tract. Perform the following
normalizations: r ´ R
P , ² ´ ¡f(P) and ¹ ² ´ P ¡ f(P). Then r » U[0;1].
10Observe that in our model all players are Bayesian rational: optimists (pessimists) do not overestimate
(underestimate) the probability that the state of the world is high. Hence, our de¯nitions di®er from the ones
that are used by behavioral economists. However, these de¯nitions are intuitive and should not confuse the reader.
80 Player one bids on tract one, player two bids on tracts two.
1
2 The auctioneer publicly announces all bids and whether they were higher or lower than the
reservation price11
1 If player i won her tract, she decides whether to drill or wait.
2 In case player ¡i drilled, player i observes the state of the world. If player i waited, she
decides whether to drill or not to drill.
3 Players receive their payo®s and the game ends.
2.2 Equilibrium
Let ht(t = 0;1;2) denote the history of the game at time t. Thus, h0 = f;g, h1 = (bi;b¡i) and
h2 = (h1;ai;1;a¡i;1;») where ai;1 2 fdrill;waitg represents player i's time-one action and » = f;g
if ai;1 = a¡i;1 = wait and is equal to the state of the world if at least one of the two players drilled
at time one. Ht denotes the set of all possible histories at time t. Let H ´
S2
t=1 Ht. A symmetric
behavioral strategy is a (¯;¸) where ¯ : fh;lg ! ¢[0;1] and ¸ : fh;lg £ H ! [0;1]. ¯(si)
represents a distribution function over player i's possible bids. ¸(si;h1) and ¸(si;h2) represent
the probabilities with which player i will respectively drill at times one and two. If r > bi (i.e. if
player i does not own tract i), then player i can never drill and, thus, ¸(si;h1) = ¸(si;h2) = 0.
A player can only drill once. Therefore, ¸(si;h2) = 0 if ai
1 = drill.
When solving my game, I rely on two equilibrium selection criteria. First, I require a candidate
equilibrium to belong to the class of the perfect Bayesian equilibria. In a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium (PBE) strategies and beliefs (concerning the other player's type) must be such that
(i) player i cannot gain by choosing a ¯ 6= ¯¤ and a ¸ 6= ¸¤ given her beliefs and (ii) beliefs
must be computed using Bayes's rule whenever possible. I de¯ne a separating equilibrium as
a PBE in which a pessimist bids bl with probability one while an optimist bids bh (6= bl) with
probability one. In such an equilibrium player i can infer player ¡i's signal out of her bid. A
pooling equilibrium is a PBE in which both types bid the same amount with probability one.
In such an equilibrium bids have no informational content and do not a®ect posteriors. A semi-
separating equilibrium is a PBE in which one type bids y with probability one, while the other
type randomizes her bid between z (6= y) and y.
Second, I restrict attention to the class of the strongly symmetric strategies. A strategy
is said to be strongly symmetric if it is symmetric and if a player who believes that her rival
11If the reservation price was made public, players could coordinate their drilling decisions on the basis of its
realization. In this paper I abstract from this more sophisticated behavior.
9possesses the same time-one posterior as herself, computes her time-one drilling probability under
the assumption that her rival will drill with the same probability as herself. To illustrate this
restriction, suppose beliefs are updated under the assumption that optimists always bid y while
pessimists always bid z (6= y). Suppose player one is an optimist while player two is a pessimist.
Suppose player one bids y while player two bids z. At time one, player one's posterior (=
Pr(Hjh;b2 = z)) is then equal to the one of player two (= Pr(Hjl;b1 = y)). As both players
possess di®erent private information, a symmetric strategy does not put any restriction on their
time-one drilling behavior.12 However, as both players possess the same time-one posterior, a
strongly symmetric strategy prescribes them to drill at time one with the same probability.
Observe that some ¸¤(¢)'s are easy to compute. For example, suppose b¡i < r < bi.
Then, player i knows that player ¡i will never drill. In that case ¸¤(si;h1) = 1 if and only
if Pr(Hjsi;b¡i) ¸ c. Similarly, suppose player i owns her tract and that she did not drill at time
one. Her time-two equilibrium drilling probabilities are then also easy to compute. For, at time
two » is either equal to the state of the world or it is equal to the empty set. In the former case
¸¤(si;h2) = 1 if and only if the state of the world is high. In the latter case, ¸¤(si;h2) = 1 if
and only if Pr(Hjsi;h2) ¸ c. Therefore, from now on I restrict attention to computing optimal
bidding and time-one drilling decisions when both players own their tracts. With a slight abuse
of notation, let ¸(si;bi;b¡i) denote player i's time-one drilling probability given her signal, her
bid, her neighbor's bid, and given that both players own their tracts.
2.3 Equilibrium behavior in the waiting game
In this subsection, I compute equilibrium behavior in the waiting game for a variety of exogenously
given bidding strategies. In the next subsection, I endogenize bidding behavior. The analysis in
this subsection is not original. In particular, Hendricks and Kovenock (1989) already analyzed a
waiting game in the context of oil exploration. Similarly, Chamley and Gale (1994) analyzed a
waiting game when the state of the world is known after all players chose their actions. I therefore
decided not to include all the proofs of this subsection in this paper. They are, however, available
upon request.
Let W(si;bi;b¡i) denote player i's undiscounted gain of waiting, given her signal and both
players' bids. Formally,
W(si;bi;b¡i) = Pr(H;a¡i;1 = drilljsi;bi;b¡i)(1 ¡ c) (1)
+Pr(a¡i;1 = waitjsi;bi;b¡i)maxf0;Pr(Hjsi;b¡i;a¡i;1 = wait) ¡ cg:
12Remember that a strategy is symmetric if players with identical private information who face identical histories
behave in an identical way.
10Lemma 1 Suppose (¸0(h;bi;b¡i);¸0(l;bi;b¡i)) << (¸00(h;bi;b¡i);¸00(l;bi;b¡i)). Then
W(si;bi;b¡i;(¸(h;¢);¸(l;¢)) = (¸0(h;¢);¸0(l;¢))) < W(si;bi;b¡i;(¸(h;¢);¸(l;¢)) = (¸00(h;¢);¸00(l;¢)))
Lemma 1 is intuitive: the higher (¸(h;¢);¸(l;¢)), the greater the probability that player ¡i will
drill and, thus, the greater the probability that player i will free-ride on her neighbor's drilling
cost.
Proposition 1 Suppose optimists bid bh with probability 1 while pessimists bid bl with probability
1 (bl < bh). Suppose both players won their tracts. Then, there exists a unique continuation










Proof: As bids perfectly reveal a player's type, both players possess the same posterior at time
one. Suppose time-one posteriors are such that
0 · Pr(Hjsi;b¡i) ¡ c < ±W(si;bi;b¡i;¸(¢) = 1): (3)
The last inequality implies that if player i expects player ¡i to drill with probability 1, it is a
best reply for her to wait. My game then possesses three di®erent continuation equilibria. In
the ¯rst one, player one drills, while player two waits. In the second one, player two drills while
player one waits. In the third one, player i drills with probability ¸¤(¢) in order to make player
¡i indi®erent between drilling and waiting. As I focus on the class of the strongly symmetric
strategies, I assume that the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium is played in the continuation
game. As bids perfectly reveal a player's type, player i does not learn anything (about s¡i) upon
observing player ¡i's time-one action. Hence, in this case equation 1 boils down to
W(si;bi;b¡i) = Pr(H;a¡i;1 = drilljsi;b¡i)(1 ¡ c)
+Pr(a¡i;1 = waitjsi;b¡i)(Pr(Hjsi;b¡i) ¡ c)
= Pr(Hjsi;b¡i) ¡ c + Pr(L;a¡i;1 = drilljsi;b¡i)c (4)
Player i is indi®erent between drilling and waiting if Pr(Hjsi;b¡i)¡c = ±W(si;bi;b¡i). Replacing
W(¢) by the right-hand side of 4, this indi®erence equation can be rewritten as
(1 ¡ ±)(Pr(Hjsi;b¡i) ¡ c) = ± Pr(L;a¡i;1 = drilljsi;b¡i)c: (5)
The left-hand side of this last equality represents player i's expected discounting cost of waiting.
The right-hand side represents her expected bene¯t of waiting: if she waits, with probabil-
ity Pr(L;a¡i;1 = drilljsi;b¡i) she will realize that there is no oil. She will then not drill at
11time two and, from a time-one perspective, save ±c. Replacing Pr(L;a¡i;1 = drilljsi;b¡i) by
Pr(Ljsi;b¡i)¸¤(¢), equation 5 boils down to ¸¤(¢) =
(1¡±)(Pr(Hjsi;b¡i)¡c)
± Pr(Ljsi;b¡i)c .13
If Pr(Hjsi;b¡i) < c, drilling yields a negative expected payo® and ¸¤(si;bi;b¡i) = 0 (as stated
in the Proposition). It follows from 5 that
±W(si;bi;b¡i;¸(¢) = 1) · Pr(Hjsi;b¡i) ¡ c
, (1 ¡ ±)(Pr(Hjsi;b¡i) ¡ c) > ± Pr(Ljsi;b¡i)c
This case prevails when the discount factor is very low. Player i then prefers to drill even if her
neighbor were to drill with probability one. Therefore in this case ¸¤(si;bi;b¡i) = 1 (as stated
in the Proposition).
Proposition 2 Suppose both tracts are marginal ones. Suppose optimists bid bh with probability
1 while pessimists bid bh with probability x 2 (0;1] and bl (< bh) with probability 1 ¡ x. There
exists then a unique continuation equilibrium in which ¸¤(l;bi;b¡i) = 0, ¸¤(h;bi;bl) = 0 and
¸¤(h;bh;bh) 2 (0;1].
The proposition states a.o. that a pessimist does not drill at time one. This is intuitive: as
both tracts are marginal ones, even if a pessimist learns that her neighbor possesses a favorable
signal, drilling at time one would still result in a negative expected payo®. Hence, if both tracts
are marginal ones a pessimist only drills at time two in case her neighbor found oil at time one.
The proposition also states that if a pessimist bids low, no one ever drills. This is also intuitive:
Player i's knowledge that her neighbor possesses signal l, leads to a downward revision of her
posterior probability of ¯nding oil. As both tracts are marginal ones, the cost of drilling now
exceeds its expected gain and no one drills. As no new information is produced at time one, no
drilling takes place at time two either.
More interestingly, suppose player i is an optimist and that her neighbor submitted a high
bid. Player i's gain of drilling then becomes Pr(Hjsi = h;b¡i = bh) ¡ c; which is positive as
Pr(Hjsi = h;b¡i = bh) ¸ Pr(Hjh) > c. Observe that, if player ¡i is an optimist she possesses
the same time-one posterior as player i. In a symmetric equilibrium, both players must drill with
the same probability. On the basis of the intermediate value theorem, one can show that there
exists a unique ¸¤(h;bh;bh). The intuition is similar to the one I explained above: If ± is \low",
¸¤(h;bh;bh) = 1 as the cost of waiting outweighs any gain of waiting. If ± is not \low", player i
chooses ¸¤(h;bh;bh) such as to make player ¡i indi®erent between drilling and waiting provided
that s¡i = h.
13It follows from the inequalities stated in 3 that this probability 2 [0;1).
12Proposition 3 Suppose both tracts are not marginal ones. Suppose pessimists bid bl with prob-
ability one, while optimists bid bh (> bl) with probability x 2 (0;1) and bl with probability 1 ¡ x.
Suppose also that ± Pr(Ljh;h)c > (1¡±)(Pr(Hjh;h)¡c). Then there exists a continuation equi-
librium in which pessimists always wait. If player i is an optimist and if (bi;b¡i) = (bl;bh), then
player i waits while player ¡i drills at time one. If (bi;b¡i) = (bh;bh), both players drill at time
one with probability ¸¤(h;bh;bh) =
(1¡±)(Pr(Hjh;h)¡c)





(1 ¡ ±)(Pr(Hjh;bl) ¡ c)
± Pr(s¡i = hjh;bl)Pr(Ljh;h)c
¾
:
I ¯rst explain the case in which both players submitted a high bid. As a high bid is only submitted
by an optimist, this implies that both players possess signal h (and thus face a positive gain of
drilling). As before, there exists a ¸¤(h;bh;bh) =
(1¡±)(Pr(Hjh;h)¡c)
± Pr(Ljh;h)c which makes both players
indi®erent between drilling and waiting.14
Suppose now that both players submitted a low bid. If player i is a pessimist, she computes
Pr(Hjl;bl) · Pr(Hjl) < c. As drilling yields a negative expected payo®, she waits. If player i is
an optimist, she computes Pr(Hjh;bl). Observe that




The inequalities above are intuitive: as both tracts are not marginal ones, player i faces a positive
gain of drilling at time two when her neighbor submitted a low bid and did not drill at time one.
This also implies that she faces a positive gain of drilling at time one. As a low bid can come
both from an optimist as from a pessimist, at time one player i is still unsure about player ¡i's
type. Suppose player ¡i drills with probability one (provided she is an optimist). Player i then
prefers to wait (if and only if)
Pr(Hjh;bl) ¡ c < ± Pr(s¡i = hjh;b¡i = bl)Pr(Hjh;h)(1 ¡ c)
+± Pr(s¡i = ljh;b¡i = bl)(Pr(Hjh;l) ¡ c)
, (1 ¡ ±)(Pr(Hjh;bl) ¡ c) < ± Pr(s¡i = hjh;bl)Pr(Ljh;h)c: (6)
Despite my restriction on ± (stated in the Proposition) the above inequality need not be satis¯ed.
To see this, suppose x is very high. In that case it is very unlikely that a low bid was submitted
by an optimist. Hence, even if player i anticipates that player ¡i will drill with probability
one (provided s¡i = h), the above inequality may be violated due to the fact that Pr(s¡i =
hjh;b¡i = bl) is very low. In that case, there exists a unique continuation equilibrium in which
14This probability is 2 (0;1) as ± Pr(Ljh;h)c is assumed to be greater than (1 ¡ ±)(Pr(Hjh;h) ¡ c).
13player i drills with probability one (as stated in the Proposition). In case inequality 6 is satis¯ed,
there exists a unique symmetric continuation equilibrium in which player i drills with probability
(1¡±)(Pr(Hjh;bl)¡c)
± Pr(s¡i=hjh;bl)Pr(Ljh;h)c (as stated in the Proposition).
Suppose now that player i submitted a high bid, while player ¡i submitted a low one. As the
tract is not a marginal one, player i, despite observing that b¡i = bl, still faces a positive gain
of drilling. Player ¡i knows this. As x 2 (0;1), both players do not possess the same time-one
posterior, and thus are not required to drill at time one with the same probability.15 This insight,
combined with the assumption that ± Pr(Ljh;h)c > (1 ¡ ±)(Pr(Hjh;h) ¡ c) implies that, within
the class of the strongly symmetric strategies, there exists a continuation equilibrium in which
player i drills at time one and in which player ¡i, independently of her signal, waits. In essence,
in this continuation equilibrium the right to free-ride is allocated to the low bidder.
2.4 Equilibrium bidding behavior
In this section players choose their bids optimally, correctly anticipating how they will a®ect
equilibrium play in the waiting game.
Proposition 4 If signals are su±ciently precise or if ± is su±ciently high or if ± is su±ciently







Pr(s¡ijsi)maxfPr(Hjsi;s¡i) ¡ c;0g: (7)
Moreover, if either signals are su±ciently precise or if both tracts are marginal and ± su±ciently
small, this equilibrium is unique.
Observe that equation 7 implies that a pessimist submits a lower bid than an optimist. The
proposition therefore provides su±cient conditions for the existence and uniqueness of a sepa-
rating equilibrium. I now explain the intuition behind the three conditions which guarantee the
existence of a separating equilibrium. Call b¤
l;s the bid of a pessimist in a separating equilibrium.
Call b¤
h;s the bid of an optimist in a separating equilibrium. Let E1(Ujsi;bi;b¡i) denote player
i's expected utility conditional on her signal, her bid, her neighbor's bid, conditional on owning
the tract and net of bidding costs.16 Let
E 1
2(Ujsi;bi) ´ Pr(b¡i = b¤
l;sjsi)E1(Ujsi;bi;b¤
l;s) + Pr(b¡i = b¤
h;sjsi)E1(Ujsi;bi;b¤
h;s):
15As a matter of fact, if player ¡i is an optimist who bid low, her posterior (=Pr(Hjh;bi = bh)) is greater than
the one of player i.
16Thus, E1(Ujsi;bi;b¡i) is solely a function of (bi;b¡i) as it in°uences both players' incentives to drill. Observe,
however, that E1(Uj¢) a priori also depends on whether player ¡i won her tract or not.
14Finally, let E0(Ujsi;bi) ´ Pr(r < bi)[E 1
2(Ujsi;bi)¡bi] denote player i's time-zero expected utility.
Observe that, as r » U[0;1], Pr(r < bi) = bi.
To understand the existence (and non-existence) of a separating equilibrium, it is useful
to consider ¯rst the hypothetical case in which signals instead of bids are revealed at time 1
2.
Suppose player i submits bid bi and that she wins her tract. Either player ¡i also won her
tract or player ¡i submitted a bid lower than the government's reservation price. In the latter
case, E0(Ujsi;bi) = maxfPr(Hjsi;s¡i) ¡ c;0g. Suppose the former case prevails. As signals
are revealed at time 1
2, both players possess the same time-one posterior. As explained in my
previous section, in a strongly symmetric equilibrium this implies that E0(Ujsi;bi) is also equal
to maxfPr(Hjsi;s¡i) ¡ c;0g. At the start of time 1







Hence, at time zero player i chooses bi to maximize bi(E 1
2(Ujsi;bi) ¡ bi). This is a very simple
strictly concave problem: if player i increases her bid, she increases her chances of winning her
tract. This bene¯t, however, comes at a cost of having to put more money on the table. The
solution to this maximization problem is given in 7.
Suppose now that bids instead of signals are disclosed and that both players focus on the candi-
date equilibrium in which players bid according to equation 7. I assume that an out-of-equilibrium
bid is supposed to have been submitted by a pessimist (i.e. Pr(si = ljbi = 2 fb¤
l;s;b¤
h;sg) = 1). What
are both types' incentives to deviate from this candidate equilibrium strategy?
Suppose s1 = h and that she bids b1 6= b¤
h;s. Without loss of generality suppose both ¯rms
won their tracts. Player two then computes Pr(Hjs2;b1 6= b¤
h;s) = Pr(Hjs2;l). If player two
is a pessimist, she computes Pr(Hjl;b1 6= b¤
h;s) = Pr(Hjl;l) < 1 ¡ p < c, and refrains from
drilling at time one. Rationally anticipating this, player one gets maxfPr(Hjh;l) ¡ c;0g. More
interestingly, suppose player two is an optimist. Player two then computes Pr(Hjh;b1 6= b¤
h;s) =
Pr(Hjh;l). Player one, however, is now more \optimistic" than player two in the sense that
her posterior (= Pr(Hjh;h)) is greater than player two's. Furthermore, player two believes that
player one possesses the same posterior as herself (even though this is not true). As I restrict
attention to the class of the strongly symmetric strategies, she computes her drilling probability
under the assumption that player one and herself play a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium in
the waiting game. It then follows from Proposition 1 that player two drills with probability
maxf0;minf1;
(1¡±)(Pr(Hjh;l)¡c)
± Pr(Ljh;l)c gg. More importantly, in the Appendix I show that player one's
gain of waiting then does not exceed her gain of drilling. The intuition is simple: player one,
having observed a high bid from player two, became \very optimistic" about the prospect of
15¯nding oil. For her \time is money" and she is only willing to postpone her drilling decision
if player two drills with a \very high" probability. Player two, however, having observed that
player one did not bid high, became much less con¯dent about the prospect of ¯nding oil. This
dented her incentives to drill at time one. Hence, if player one deviates, at time one she gets
maxfPr(Hjh;s2) ¡ c;0g, which is the same (time-one) payo® as the one she would have gotten
had she not deviated. As the time-zero payo® function is strictly concave, player one strictly
loses by submitting any bid di®erent from b¤
h;s.
I now consider a pessimist's incentives to deviate. Given my hypothesized out-of-equilibrium
beliefs, she cannot gain by submitting a bid 6= b¤
h;s. Suppose she submits b1 = b¤
h;s, that she wins
her tract and that she waits.17 Then, at time 1
















The two terms between curly brackets represent player one's expected gain of waiting if player
two is an optimist: With probability Pr(Hjl;h)¸¤(h;b¤
h;s;b¤
h;s) player two drills and ¯nds oil in
which case player one gets ±(1 ¡ c). With probability (1 ¡ ¸¤(h;b¤
h;s;b¤
h;s)) player two waits in
which case player one gets ± maxfPr(Hjl;h)¡c;0g. The term between square brackets represents
her expected gain of waiting if player two is a pessimist: With probability Pr(r < b¤
l;sjr < b¤
h;s)
player two then also wins her tract in which case player one's high bid induces her to drill with
probability ¸¤(l;b¤
l;s;b¤
h;s). With probability Pr(Hjl;l) player two then discovers oil which allows
player one to obtain ±(1¡c). Suppose now that player one submits a low bid, that she wins her
tract and that she waits. At time 1





l;s)±(1 ¡ c) + (1 ¡ ¸¤(¢))± maxfPr(Hjl;h) ¡ c;0g
o
: (9)
To understand player one's incentives to deviate, compare 8 with 9. Observe that in 9 an optimist
drills with probability ¸¤(h;b¤
h;s;b¤
l;s), while in 8 she drills with probability ¸¤(h;b¤
h;s;b¤
h;s). Sim-
ilarly, in 9, a pessimist does not drill at all, while in 8 she drills with probability ¸¤(l;b¤
l;s;b¤
h;s).




h;s). This is intuitive: by bidding b¤
h;s, player
one succeeds to make her neighbor \more optimistic" about the prospect of ¯nding oil. As ex-
plained in my previous section, this induces player two to drill with a (weakly) higher probability.
It then follows from Lemma 1 that this (weakly) increases her gain of waiting.
17Of course, it remains to be seen whether she would prefer to wait. It should, however, be obvious that player
one's gain of drilling is una®ected by her bid. To understand player one's incentives to deviate, I can therefore
restrict attention to how her bid a®ects her gain of waiting.
16Submitting a high bid, however, also involves a cost: Player one may have to pay \a lot"
of money for a piece of sea below which she thinks there is no oil! If signals are su±ciently
precise, the di®erence between b¤
h;s and b¤
l;s is very big. Optimists are very con¯dent that there
is oil underneath the sea and are prepared to submit a \very high" bid to secure the purchase of
the tract. Pessimists, however, are very skeptical concerning the probability of ¯nding oil, and
therefore refuse to bid as if they possess favorable private information (correctly anticipating that
this will dent their neighbor's incentives to drill). If ± is low, player one has also little incentives
to submit a high bid. For, any increase in her (undiscounted) gain of waiting (thanks to a higher
probability of drilling) is then o®set by the low discount factor. Perhaps more surprisingly, if ±
is high, player one has also little incentives to submit a high bid. To see this, consider equation
5. The equation teaches us that in equilibrium the discounting cost of waiting must balance the
gain of waiting. If the discount factor is high, the opportunity cost of waiting is low (even if
player two became \very optimistic" about the prospects of ¯nding oil). Player two's equilibrium
drilling probability is then not very sensitive to her time-one posterior. This strongly reduces
player one's gain of bidding as if she had favorable private information. Hence, in all these cases
there exists a separating equilibrium.
It is worth stressing that the three conditions guaranteeing existence of a separating equilib-
rium are are not necessary ones. To see this, suppose signals are very imprecise and that player
one is a pessimist. Suppose also that players focus on the separating equilibrium. As signals are
imprecise, b¤
h;s and b¤
l;s (as computed in 7) are close to each other. Hence, player one's cost of
bidding as if she possesses favorable private information (i.e. b¤
h;s ¡b¤
l;s) is low. Player one's gain
of submitting bid b¤
h;s, however, is also low. For, if signals are imprecise player two's posterior
(and thus also her drilling probability) is hardly in°uenced by her observation that player one
bid \high". One can ¯nd values of (p;c;±) (where p is su±ciently low), such that the bene¯t of
bidding \high" is even lower than its cost.
In this paper I mainly focus on equilibria in which at most two di®erent bids can be observed.
Many more sophisticated equilibria (involving randomization over more than two bids) may also
exist. Proposition 4 states two su±cient conditions under which I can safely rule those ones
out (within the class of the strongly symmetric strategies). The logic behind the proof of this
uniqueness result is straightforward. Consider candidate equilibrium strategies in which optimists
and pessimists randomize their bids according to some distribution functions. Call bh, the lowest
bid that can be submitted by an optimist in a candidate equilibrium strategy. Call bl, the highest
bid that can be submitted by a pessimist in a candidate equilibrium strategy. It is easy to show
that if signals are su±ciently precise (or if both tracts are marginal ones and if ± is su±ciently
small) in any candidate equilibrium bl < bh. This is intuitive: if signals are su±ciently precise an
17optimist would never agree to submit a bid close to zero even if this guaranteed her the right to
free-ride with probability one. In that case any bid will perfectly reveal a player's type. It then
follows from the second paragraph following Proposition 4 that both players face a very simple
(strictly) concave maximization problem, which possesses a unique equilibrium.
Proposition 5 Suppose both tracts are marginal ones. Then, either there exists a separating
or there exists a pooling equilibrium (in which both types bid b¤
h;p = 1
2(p ¡ c)). The equilibrium,
however, need not be unique. In particular, there exist values of (p;c;±) which support a separat-





h;ss with probability x 2 (0;1) and zero with probability (1 ¡ x).
The proposition states a.o. that, as far as marginal tracts are concerned, existence of an
equilibrium is always guaranteed. Unfortunately (though not surprisingly) the equilibrium need
not be unique.
In a pooling equilibrium a pessimist bids as if she possesses favorable private information. This
\high" bid, however, does not succeed to make her neighbor more optimistic about the prospect
of ¯nding oil. Nonetheless, it is optimal for her to bid b¤
h;p, because if she were to submit a
di®erent bid instead, this would reveal that she possesses unfavorable private information. As
the tract is a marginal one, this would eliminate her neighbor's incentives to drill (and any hope
she had to free-ride on her neighbor's drilling cost). An optimist cannot gain by deviating either:
If she bids bi 6= b¤
h;p, she destroys he neighbor's incentives to drill. It is then optimal for her
to drill and E1(Ujh;b1 6= b¤
h;p;b¤
h;p) = p ¡ c. If she bids bi = b¤
h;p (and wins her tract), she
engages in a war-of-attrition with her neighbor (which implies that E1(Ujh;b¤
h;p;b¤
h;p) = p ¡ c).
Independently of her bid, her time-one payo® is thus equal to p ¡ c. Correctly anticipating this,
























As the tract is a marginal one, Pr(Hjh;l) = 1
2 < c. Hence, an optimist bids more aggressively in
the separating than in the pooling equilibrium. This is intuitive: in the separating equilibrium
an optimist learns her neighbor's signal through her bid. As the tract is a marginal one, this
information is very valuable to her. For, if she were to ¯nd out that her neighbor is a pessimist, she
would refrain from drilling and save c¡Pr(Hjh;l). Stated di®erently, the separating equilibrium
provides an optimist with valuable information which increases her willingness to buy the tract
18(and thus to bid more aggressively). Hence, there exist values of (p;c;±) which support multiple
equilibria: If players focus on the separating equilibrium, optimists bid aggressively and thereby
discourage a pessimist from submitting the same bid. On the other hand if an optimist anticipates
that her neighbor will bid 1
2(p¡c) independently of her private information, she values the tract
less, bids less aggressively and thereby encourages a pessimist to submit the same bid as hers.
In the Appendix, I show that some values of my exogenous parameters also support a semi-
separating equilibrium in which optimists bid b¤
h;ss 2 (b¤
h;p;b¤
h;s), while pessimists bid b¤
h;ss with
probability x and zero with probability 1 ¡ x. The intuition is identical to the one I explained
above. An optimist knows that if her neighbor submits a high bid, she will be more con¯dent
about her prospects of ¯nding oil. This increases her time-zero willingness to buy the tract
(which explains why she now submits a bid between b¤
h;p and b¤
h;s). If a pessimist bids b¤
h;ss, from
Proposition 2 she knows that this increases the likelihood that she will free-ride on her neighbor's
drilling cost. The increase in her gain of waiting, however, is fully compensated by the fact that
she has to bid more aggressively to hide her bad private information. Therefore, a pessimist is
indi®erent between bidding zero and b¤
h;ss.18
The proposition below shows that my game may also be characterized by an equilibrium in
which an optimist bids as if she has \bad" private information.
Proposition 6 There exist values of (p;c;±) which support an equilibrium in which pessimists
bid b¤
l;ss with probability one, while optimists bid b¤
h;ss (> b¤
l;ss) with probability x 2 (0;1) and b¤
l;ss
with probability (1¡x). Such an equilibrium only exists if ± Pr(Ljh;h)c > (1¡±)[Pr(Hjh;h)¡c].
In the appendix I prove the existence of such an equilibrium when both tracts are not marginal
ones. I conjecture, however, that such an equilibrium also exists when both tracts are marginal
ones. The equilibrium is supported by the continuation strategies summarized in Proposition
3. An optimist knows that if she bids \high" she will either engage in a war-of-attrition with
her neighbor (in case her neighbor also submitted a high bid) or she will drill with probability
one (in case her neighbor submitted a \low" bid). In either case her time- 1
2 expected payo®
equals p ¡ c. Moreover, I also assume that any out-of-equilibrium bid is supposed to have been




l;ss) = p¡c. Given this time-1
2 expected payo®, player one's optimal non-b¤
l;ss bid
equals 1
2(p ¡ c) ´ b¤
h;ss.
18Proposition 5 establishes the existence of a semi-separating equilibrium when both tracts are marginal ones. I
have been able to prove that a pooling equilibrium fails to exist when both tracts are not marginal ones. A semi-
separating equilibrium (in which pessimists bid b¤
h;ss with probability x), however, also exists for some (p;c;±)0s
when c 2 (1 ¡ p; 1
2). As the proofs of both results lack interest, I decided not to include them in this paper.
19x¤ and b¤
l;ss are determined on the basis of the following two equations in two unknowns:
E0(Ujh;b1 = b¤









The ¯rst equation ensures that an optimist is indi®erent between submitting either one of the
two bids. The second equation ensures that a pessimist chooses her bid optimally. To gain some
insight behind this system of simultaneous equations suppose player i is an optimist. In this
equilibrium she is indi®erent between submitting both bids because the gain of bidding low (i.e.
increasing the probability that she will be allocated the right to free-ride) is compensated by
its cost (i.e. lower probability of winning the tract). Observe that an optimist only values the
right to free-ride if the discount rate is su±ciently high. For, if ± were low, player i would prefer
to drill at time one even if she anticipates her neighbor to drill too! This explains why this
semi-separating equilibrium only exists if ± is su±ciently high. If x = 0, player ¡i never bids
high. Hence, the right to free-ride is never allocated to player i, and there is no gain in bidding
\low". Stated di®erently, if x = 0 (i.e. if player ¡i always bids as if she were a pessimist) it is
a best reply for player i to bid b¤
h;ss. The higher x, the higher the probability that she will be
allocated the right to free ride (provided she bids \low"), and the higher player i's gain of bidding
\low". Similarly, a pessimist values the tract more (and thus bids more aggressively) when x
increases. As b¤
l;ss is increasing in x, this reduces player i's cost of bidding \low". Both reasons
explain why E0(Ujh;b1 = b¤
h;ss) is increasing in x. It can easily be shown that for some (p;c;±)
it is a best response for player i to bid b¤
l;ss when x is close to one. It then follows from the
intermediate value theorem that there exists a semi separating equilibrium of the type described
in the Proposition.
According to HP it takes about three months to set up and complete an exploratory drilling
program. Hence, if the outcome of a ¯rm's exploratory drilling program is rapidly learnt by
neighboring ¯rms, one should expect the discount factor to be very high. HP therefore estimated
a discount factor equal to 0.99 while Lin (2006) worked with a discount factor of 0.9. On the
basis of those discount factors it is reasonable to assume that if player i anticipates her neighbor
to drill, she prefers to wait. Hence, the necessary condition set forth in Proposition 6 is most
likely satis¯ed. It needs to be mentioned, however, that HP considered drilling activities that
took place between 1954 and 1981. At that time drilling mainly occurred in shallow waters.
Nowadays drilling mainly occurs in deep to ultra-deep waters19 where presumably exploratory
19Shallow water refer to water depths less than 305 meters (1000 feet). Deepwater refers to water depths
between 305 meters and 1524 meters (5000 feet). Ultra-deepwater refers to water depths greater than 1524 meters
(www.mms.gov/ld/PDFs/GreenBook-LeasingDocument.pdf).
20drilling programs take more time to complete. Furthermore, a low ± can also be interpreted as
an anticipated future oil price reduction as ¯rms should then have more incentives to drill early.
Hence, if ¯rms anticipate important future oil price reductions, or if it takes much more time
to learn about the outcome of exploratory drilling programs in deep to ultra-deep waters, the
necessary condition stated in Proposition 6 need not be satis¯ed.
3 Some Empirical Implications
In this section I argue that the equilibrium set forth in Proposition 6 best ¯ts the existing
empirical evidence. Consider the following probit regression model:
Pr(drill) = ¯0 + ¯1 £ bid + ¯2 £ (bid £ neigbhor bid) + ¯3 £ neighbor bid + :::
where Pr(drill) denotes the probability that player i drills at time one and where \..." indicates
the presence of other explanatory variables. At the risk of stating the obvious, my model implies
that this regression may su®er from endogeneity problems. In the equilibrium highlighted in
Proposition 6 a pessimist bids \not low" because she knows that it is not unlikely that her
neighbor will drill. Her neighbor's decision to drill, however, is also partly in°uenced by her bid.
Hence, the coe±cients in this model should be interpreted as (interesting) correlations. HP found
that ¯1 > 0 and that ¯3 < 0. Both coe±cients were signi¯cantly di®erent from zero at the 5%
level. Unfortunately, they did not include the interaction term in their regression equation.
Suppose without loss of generality that c < 1
2, that players focus on the separating equilibrium
and that (bi;b¡i) = (b¤
l;s;b¤
l;s). My model predicts then that player i drills with probability zero.
Suppose now that (bi;b¡i) = (b¤
l;s;b¤
h;s). As explained in Proposition 1, player i then drills
with a strictly positive probability. Suppose now that player ¡i increases her bid (from b¤
l;s to
b¤
h;s) keeping player i's bid constant at b¤
h;s. It then follows from Proposition 1 that player i's






± Pr(Ljh;h)c . Hence, the separating
equilibrium predicts that ¯3 > 0. The intuition behind this result is straightforward: In a
separating equilibrium player ¡i only increases her bid if she possesses more favorable private
information. As players i and ¡i become more con¯dent about their prospects of ¯nding oil, it
follows from my discussion in section 2.3 that in a strongly symmetric continuation equilibrium
both players increase their drilling probabilities.20
The table below summarizes the equilibrium drilling probabilities as a function of observed
20As mentioned in footnote 18, if c < 1
2 there may also exist a semi-separating equilibrium in which pessimists
bid b¤
h;ss with probability x. It can be shown that this semi-separating equilibrium also predicts that ¯3 > 0 for
essentially the same reason as the one I explained in the paragraph above.
21bids when players focus on the semi-separating equilibrium (in which optimists bid b¤
l;ss with
probability 1 ¡ x).
Table 1: Probability that player i drills at time one as a function of (bi;b¡i) in the equilibrium set




l;ss) Pr(si = ljbi = b¤















The table above reveals that an increase in b¡i reduces player i's drilling probability both when
bi = b¤
l;ss and when bi = b¤
h;ss. Moreover, a quick comparison between A and B and between
C and D also reveals that | keeping b¡i constant | Pr(drill) is increasing in bi. Hence, this
equilibrium predicts that ¯1 > 0 and that ¯3 < 0. Furthermore, the table also tells us that
B ¡ A > D ¡ C if and only if






which, if ± > 0:9, is very likely to be satis¯ed (as Pr(si = hjbi = b¤
l;ss) < 1
2 and as ¸¤(¢) is low
when ± is high). Hence, the equilibrium set forth in Proposition 6 also predicts that ¯2 < 0.
As mentioned in my introduction, the hazard rate of drilling features a U-shaped pattern.
The equilibrium set forth in Proposition 6 is not inconsistent with this ¯nding either. Sometimes
(i.e. if player i bids low while her neighbor bids high) players succeed to coordinate their drilling
activities, which explains a high probability of drilling in year one. If players fail to coordinate
their drilling decisions through their bids, they play a standard war-of-attrition, which explains
why in years 2, 3, and 4 the hazard rate of drilling is \low". In year 5 the probability of drilling
is \high" because of the end-game e®ect. This explanation is di®erent from the one provided by
HP. In their model a player's bid is assumed to be exogenous and to perfectly reveal her private
information (as is the case in the equilibrium set forth in Proposition 4). The high probability
of drilling in year one is then explained on the basis that in year one the risk set (i.e. the set of
undrilled tracts) contains relatively many tracts for which players share optimistic beliefs. In year
three the risk set is less likely to contain tracts with optimistic beliefs as many of them have been
drilled in earlier periods. There are two problems with this explanation. First, it is inconsistent
with their ¯nding that ¯3 < 0. Second, equation 5 teaches us that drilling probabilities are
computed to balance the opportunity cost of waiting with its (informational) gain of waiting.
22The equation also shows that if the discount factor is close to one, drilling probabilities are close
to zero, independently of players' posteriors. As argued in my previous section, HP estimated
a discount factor equal to 0.99. Unless signals are extremely informative, one would then not
expect to see the sharp21 reduction in the hazard rate observed in the data.
4 A Revenue Implication
Suppose (p;c;±) supports both a semi-separating (in which optimists bid b¤
l;ss with probability 1¡
x) and a separating equilibrium.22 Remember that b¤
h;s and b¤
l;s can be interpreted as equilibrium
bids if signals (instead of bids) were revealed at time 1
2. One can then show:
Proposition 7 The semi-separating equilibrium set forth in Proposition 6 may yield more ex-
pected revenues in comparison with the benchmark case in which players abstract from any sig-
nalling motive.
Recall that in the separating equilibrium an optimist bids b¤
h;s = 1
2(p¡c). In the semi-separating
equilibrium she randomizes her bid between b¤
h;ss = 1




immediate that an optimist bids more aggressively in the separating equilibrium. Comparing
b¤
l;ss with b¤
l;s, however, is a more delicate matter. As argued above, b¤
l;ss is computed out of
a system of two equations in two unknowns. As x (= Pr(b¡i = b¤
h;ssjs¡i = h)) increases, it
becomes more likely that player i's neighbor will drill and this increases her willingness to bid
more aggressively. The Proposition states that b¤
l;ss ¡ b¤
l;s can become so big to compensate the
government for any lost revenues due to an optimist's strategic \low" bidding behavior.
5 Conclusions
In this paper I did not tackle the question: \How should oil and gas ¯elds be auctioned o®?" The
¯ndings of this paper suggest that the optimal auction format depends on the importance of the
information externality at the drilling stage. As documented by HP the information externality
is important in drilling for oil in the outer continental shelf of the US. In other parts of the world
the information externality is less important. For example in Libya the probability of ¯nding oil
is much higher than in the Gulf of Mexico. Similarly, o®shore drilling (in the Gulf of Mexico) is
more expensive than drilling in Libya. This might explain why the Libyan Government decided
21The hazard rate of drilling in the third quarter is §10%, while it is §5% in the seventh quarter.
22In the appendix I show that the set of (p;c;±)'s which support both types of equilibria is non-empty.
23to auction their oil ¯elds (predominantly) using ¯rst-price sealed royalty rate23 bidding while the
US (predominantly) used a standard ¯rst-price sealed bid auction (followed by bid disclosure).
More research is needed to shed light on this and related questions.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 4
I ¯rst state and prove:
Lemma 2
Pr(Hjh;h) ¡ c ¸ ±[Pr(Hjh;h) ¡ c + Pr(Ljh;h)¸¤(h;b¤
h;s;b¤
l;s)c]:
Proof: Suppose b¡i = b¤
h;s , s¡i = h and b¡i = b¤
l;s , s¡i = l. Suppose player ¡i expects
player i to follow the same bidding behavior as herself. It follows from Proposition 1 that if
bi = b¤











while if bi = b¤











It is straightforward to see that the latter probability is (weakly) greater than the former one. It
follows from the proof of Proposition 1 that
Pr(Hjh;h) ¡ c ¸ ±[Pr(Hjh;h) ¡ c + Pr(Ljh;h)¸¤(h;b¤
h;s;b¤
h;s)c];
where the right-hand side denotes player i's gain of waiting given that (si;s¡i) = (h;h) and











h;s)) = 0, it follows from Lemma 1 that
Pr(Hjh;h) ¡ c ¸ ±[Pr(Hjh;h) ¡ c + Pr(Ljh;h)¸¤(h;b¤
h;s;b¤
l;s)c]:
The Lemma above together with the explanations following Proposition 4 prove that an
optimist cannot gain by setting bi 6= b¤
h;s. It follows from Proposition 1 that if a pessimist bids
b¤







Pr(s¡ijl)maxf0;Pr(Hjl;s¡i) ¡ cg: (10)
23Under royalty rate bidding ¯rms bid percentage ¯gures. If, for example, a ¯rm bids 80%, this means that she
is prepared to give 80% of the value of the extracted oil to the government if awarded the tract.
24If a pessimist bids b¤










h;s;b¡i) is given in equation 8. As an optimist cannot gain by deviating, a separating
equilibrium exists if and only if E0(Ujl;b¤
l;s) ¸ E0(Ujl;b¤








where the inequality follows from the fact that bi[E 1
2(Ujl;b¤
l;s)¡bi] is a strictly concave function
and reaches its maximum when bi = b¤
l;s. Observe also that if ± is close to one, ¸¤(¢) = 0 and
E0(Ujl;b¤
h;s) < E0(Ujl;b¤
l;s) for the same reason. By continuity, there exists a ±(c;p) > 0 and
a ±(c;p) < 1 such that all ± · ±(c;p) and all ± ¸ ±(c;p) support a separating equilibrium.
Finally, if p is close to one, it follows from 7, 10, 11 and 8 that b¤
l;s = 0, b¤
h;s = 1
2(1 ¡ c) and
E 1
2(Ujl;b¤
l;s) = E 1
2(Ujl;b¤
h;s) = 0. Hence, if p is close to one, E0(Ujl;b¤
h;s) < E0(Ujl;b¤
l;s). By
continuity, there exists a p(c;±) 2 [1
2;1) such that all p ¸ p(c;±) support a separating equilibrium.
I now prove the uniqueness part of Proposition 4. Suppose s1 = h and consider candidate
equilibrium strategies in which optimists randomize their bids according to an arbitrary c.d.f.
¯(h) and pessimists according to an arbitrary c.d.f. ¯(l). Let bmin(¯(h)) ´ inffb : Pr(b1 = bjs1 =
h;¯(h)) > 0g. Let bh ´ minfbmin(¯(h)) : ¯(h) is part of an equilibrium strategyg. Observe that,
in any equilibrium, E0(Ujh;b1) ¸ 1
4(p ¡ c)2 > 0 as player one always has the possibility to bid
1
2(p ¡ c) and, if awarded the tract, to drill at time one independent of player two's bid. This
implies that 8(p;c;±), bh > 0.










where ±W(l;b1;b2) denotes player 1's gain of waiting given her signal, her bid and her rival's bid
and where F(b2) = Pr(s2 = hjl)¯(h) + Pr(s2 = ljl)¯(l) represents the c.d.f. of player two's bid
conditional on s1. Observe also that E 1
2(Ujl;b1) is computed conditional upon whether r < b2






The inequality above comes from the fact that player one may take the wrong time-one decision
(e.g. she may drill at time one when, had she known player two's type, she would have preferred









maxfPr(Hjl;s2) ¡ c;± Pr(Hjl;s2)(1 ¡ c)gPr(s2jl) ´ bl:
25Note: if p is close to one, bl is close to zero. Similarly, if c > 1
2 and if ± is close to zero, bl is also
close to zero. Note also that a pessimist will never submit a bid higher than bl as she would then
get a negative payo®. Thus, for p close to one, or if c > 1
2 and if ± is close to zero, bl < bh. As
bl is continuous in p and ±, there exists a pc 2 [1
2;1) and a ±c 2 (0;1), such that if p ¸ pc or if
c > 1
2 and ± · ±c in any equilibrium the highest bid of a pessimist is lower than the lowest bid
of an optimist.
Suppose p is su±ciently high such that bl < bh. It then follows from my two previous






As a bid reveals a player's type, at time one both players possess the same posterior. As I focus on
the class of the strongly symmetric strategies, this implies that both players must drill with the
same probability (provided both players won their respective tracts). In particular, this implies






Pr(s2js1)maxfPr(Hjs1;s2) ¡ c;0g ¡ b1
#
;













±(1¡p)2c , ¸1 ´
(1¡±)(p¡c)
±(1¡p)2c , and ¸2 ´
p¡c
±p2(1¡c). Observe that
¸0 < 1 , p2(1 ¡ c) ¡ (1 ¡ p)2c < ±p2(1 ¡ c): (12)
I ¯rst state and prove the following Lemmas.
Lemma 3 If c > 1
2, ¸0 > ¸1.
Proof: The stated inequality can be written as
Pr(hjh)[Pr(Hjh;h) ¡ c] > Pr(hjh)[Pr(Hjh;h) ¡ c] + Pr(ljh)[Pr(Hjh;l) ¡ c];
which is satis¯ed as Pr(Hjh;l) = 1
2 < c.
Lemma 4 ¸0 < 1 , ¸1 < ¸2
26Proof:
¸1 < ¸2 , (1 ¡ ±)p2(1 ¡ c) < (1 ¡ p)2c:;












The proof of this Lemma is identical to the one present in the proof of Proposition 2 (available
upon request) and is therefore omitted.
Suppose c > 1
2 and that beliefs are updated under the assumption that optimists bid bh
with probability one, while pessimists bid bh with probability x and zero with probability 1 ¡x.
Suppose also that out-of-equilibrium beliefs are computed under the assumption that Pr(si =
ljbi = 2 fbl;bhg) = 1. Let bh ´ 1
2 Pr(b¡i = bhjh)(Pr(Hjh;bh) ¡ c):
Suppose si = h and that she bids bh. By de¯nition, E 1
2(Ujh;bh) ´ Pr(b¡i = bhjh)E1(Ujh;bh;bh)
+Pr(b¡i = bljh)E1(Ujh;bh;bl): As c > 1
2 = Pr(Hjh;b¡i = bl), E1(Ujh;bh;bl) = 0. If bi = b¡i =
bh, both players play a war-of-attrition. In the symmetric equilibrium (in which pessimists do
not drill at time one while optimists drill with some probability) optimists either strictly prefer
to drill at time one (i.e. when ± is \low") or they will be indi®erent between drilling and waiting
(i.e. when ± is not \low"). In both cases, E1(Ujh;bh;bh) = Pr(Hjh;bh) ¡ c, and
E 1
2(Ujh;bi = bh) = Pr(b¡i = bhjh)(Pr(Hjh;bh) ¡ c): (13)
Suppose now that bi 6= bh. As mentioned above, players compute their posteriors under the
assumption that Pr(si = ljbi 6= bh) = 1. Hence, Pr(Hjs¡i = h;bi 6= bh) = 1
2 < c. Player i knows
that, if bi 6= bh, she will never free-ride on her neighbor's drilling cost and
E 1
2(Ujh;bi 6= bh) = Pr(b¡i = bhjh)(Pr(Hjh;bh) ¡ c): (14)
It follows from 13 and 14 that player i's maximization problem can be written as
max
bi
E0(Ujh;bi) = bi[Pr(b¡i = bhjh)(Pr(Hjh;bh) ¡ c ¡ bi];





Pr(b¡i = bhjh)(Pr(Hjh;bh) ¡ c) = bh: (15)
Hence, an optimist cannot gain by bidding di®erently than bh.
Suppose now that si = l. Let
¢(l;x) = E0(Ujl;bi = 0;x) ¡ E0(Ujl;bi = bh;x):
27Intuitively, ¢(l;x) measures player i's incentives to bid low (as opposed to bidding as if she had
a high signal) given that player ¡i computes her posterior under the assumption that Pr(bi =
bhjsi = l) = x. If ¢(l;x) ¸ 0, player i prefers to bid low (despite the fact that she knows
that this will reduce her neighbor's incentives to drill). From my preceding paragraphs we know
that an optimist cannot gain by setting bi 6= bh. Hence, a separating equilibrium exists if and
only if ¢(l;0) ¸ 0. A pooling equilibrium exists if and only if ¢(l;1) · 0, while a semi-
separating equilibrium (in which pessimists bid bh with probability x¤ 2 (0;1)) exists if and only
if ¢(l;x¤) = 0.
Observe that E0(Ujl;0;x) = 0 8x. Furthermore,
E0(Ujl;bh;x) = bhfPr(H;s¡i = hjl)¸¤(h;bh;bh)±(1 ¡ c) ¡ bhg: (16)
Observe that bh and all the probabilities in the equation above are continuous in x. Moreover,
it follows from the proof of Proposition 2 (available upon request) that ¸¤(h;bh;bh) is also
continuous in x. Hence, ¢(l;x) is continuous in x, and there exists a strongly symmetric PBE.
It follows from equations 15 and 16 that
¢(l;0) ¸ 0 , Pr(H;s¡i = hjl)¸¤(h;b¤
h;s;b¤
h;s)±(1 ¡ c) ·
1
2
Pr(hjh)[Pr(Hjh;h) ¡ c]; (17)
and that
¢(l;1) · 0 , Pr(H;s¡i = hjl)¸¤(h;b¤
h;p;b¤
h;p)±(1 ¡ c) ¸
1
2
[Pr(Hjh) ¡ c]: (18)
Lemma 6 If c > 1
2, and if p2(1¡c)¡(1¡p)2c < ±p2(1¡c) there either exists a separating or there
exists a pooling equilibrium. No (p;c;±) supports both a separating and a pooling equilibrium.
Proof: From equation 12 we know that p2(1 ¡ c) ¡ (1 ¡ p)2c < ±p2(1 ¡ c) , ¸0 < 1, and, thus,
¸¤(h;b¤
h;s;b¤
h;s) = ¸0. This insight, combined with Lemmas 3, 4, 5 and with our assumption
that c > 1
2 allows me to conclude that ¸¤(h;b¤
h;p;b¤
h;p) = ¸1. Hence, inequalities 17 and 18 can
respectively be rewritten as p(1 ¡ ±)(1 ¡ c) · 1
2(1 ¡ p)c; and as p(1 ¡ ±)(1 ¡ c) ¸ 1
2(1 ¡ p)c:
Obviously, both inequalities cannot be simultaneously satis¯ed (except in the non-generic case
in which p(1 ¡ ±)(1 ¡ c) = 1
2(1 ¡ p)c).
Lemma 7 If c > 1
2 and if p2(1 ¡ c) ¡ (1 ¡ p)2c > ±p2(1 ¡ c), there either exists a separating or
there exists a pooling equilibrium. Moreover there exists values of the parameters which support
a separating, a pooling and a semi-separating equilibrium.
Proof: As p2(1 ¡ c) ¡ (1 ¡ p)2c > ±p2(1 ¡ c), it follows from inequality 12 that ¸0 > 1, and,
thus, that ¸¤(h;b¤
h;s;b¤
h;s) = 1. This insight, combined with Lemma 4, allows me to conclude
that ¸1 > ¸2. There are two possible cases: (i) ¸2 ¸ 1, and (ii) ¸2 < 1.
28In case (i), inequalities 17 and 18 boil down to
±p(1 ¡ p)(1 ¡ c) ·
1
2
(p2(1 ¡ c) ¡ (1 ¡ p)2c); and




Observe that, if c > 1
2, p2(1 ¡ c) ¡ (1 ¡ p)2c > p ¡ c. Hence, there are three di®erent subcases:
either ±p(1¡p)(1¡c) · 1
2(p¡c) < 1
2(p2(1¡c)¡(1¡p)2c); in which case there exists a separating,
but no pooling equilibrium, or 1
2(p ¡ c) < ±p(1 ¡ p)(1 ¡ c) < 1
2(p2(1 ¡ c) ¡ (1 ¡ p)2c); in which
case there exists a separating, a pooling and, by continuity, a semi-separating equilibrium, or
1
2(p ¡ c) < 1
2(p2(1 ¡ c) ¡ (1 ¡ p)2c) · ±p(1 ¡ p)(1 ¡ c); in which case there exists a pooling but
no separating equilibrium. Note that in this case, there always exists either a separating or a
pooling equilibrium.
In case (ii), inequalities 17 and 18 boil down to
±p(1 ¡ p)(1 ¡ c) ·
1
2





I now show that if p > 2
3 (i.e. if there does not exist a pooling equilibrium), then there exists a










p ±p2(1¡c) < 1
2(p2(1¡c)¡(1¡p)2c); which is equivalent to 19. Hence,
as in the former case, there always exists either a pooling or a separating equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 6
The equilibrium is supported by the continuation strategies summarized in Proposition 3. More-
over, I assume that o®-the-equilibrium path, players compute their posteriors under the assump-
tion that Pr(si = hjbi = 2 fb¤
l;ss;b¤
h;ssg) = 1. I ¯rst show that a pessimist cannot gain by deviating




Step 1: Suppose s1 = l and that b1 = b¤
l;ss. As b¤
l;ss < b¤
h;ss, Pr(r < b2jr < b1) = 1. It then
follows from Proposition 3 that
E 1
2(Ujl;b1 = b¤
l;ss) = Pr(b2 = b¤
h;ssjl)Pr(Hjl;h)±(1 ¡ c) (20)




Observe that E 1
2(Ujl;b1 = b¤
l;ss) only depends on (p;c;±;x¤) but not on player one's bid. Let
b¤
l;ss 2 argmaxb1 E0(Ujl;b1) = b1(E 1
2(Ujl;b1 = b¤












Pr(H;hjl)±(1 ¡ c): (21)
Suppose s1 = l, b2 = b¤
h;ss and b1 = 2 fb¤
l;ss;b¤
h;ssg. If b2 = b¤
h;ss < r, player one's payo® (net of
bidding costs) equals zero. Suppose that r < b2 = b¤
h;ss. As player two computes her posterior
under the assumption that player one is an optimist, she believes that her time-one posterior
(= Pr(Hjh;h)) is equal to the one of player one (= Pr(Hjh;b2 = b¤
h;ss)). As I focus on strongly
symmetric strategies, I assume that player two believes that player one will drill with the same
probability as herself. It follows from Proposition 3 that this implies that player two will drill




± Pr(Ljh;h)c ; which, by assumption, is less
than one. Suppose now that s1 = l, b2 = b¤
l;ss and b1 = 2 fb¤
l;ss;b¤
h;ssg. As player two believes
that player one is an optimist and as b2 = b¤
l;ss, I assume that she anticipates that player one
will drill. As ± Pr(Ljh;h)c > (1 ¡ ±)(Pr(Hjh;h) ¡ c), it is then optimal for her to wait. Hence,
E 1
2(Ujl;b1 = 2 fb¤
l;ss;b¤





Observe that E 1
2(Ujl;b1 = 2 fb¤
l;ss;b¤
h;ssg) · E 1




2(Ujl;b1 = 2 fb¤
l;ss;b¤
h;ssg) ´ Pr(b2 = b¤
h;ssjl)Pr(Hjl;h)¸¤(h;b¤
h;ss;b¤
h;ss)±(1 ¡ c); (22)
which is independent of player one's bid.
Let bod









:24 Observe that both bod
l
and b¤
l;ss were chosen to maximize bi(E 1
2(Ujl;¢) ¡ bi), where both time-one expectations are in-












h;ssg) < E 1
2(Ujl;b1 = b¤
l;ss). Thus, player one cannot gain by setting b1 = 2 fb¤
l;ss;b¤
h;ssg.
Suppose now that s1 = l and that b1 = b¤
h;ss. Using an identical reasoning as in our previous
paragraph, player two will drill with probability ¸¤(h;b¤
h;ss;b¤
h;ss) if b2 = b¤
h;ss and with probability
zero if b2 = b¤
l;ss. As above, player one can then not gain by setting b1 = b¤
h;ss.
Step 2: Suppose s1 = h and that she bids b¤
h;ss. Suppose she won her tract. It then follows from
Proposition 3 that her payo® is equal to the one she gets if she were to drill at time one with
probability one. Hence, E 1
2(Ujh;b¤
h;ss) = p¡c. Let b¤




Suppose s1 = h and that she bids b¤
l;ss. Suppose she wins her tract. As b¤
l;ss < b¤
h;ss,
Pr(r < b2jr < b1) = 1. It then follows from Proposition 3 that
E 1
2(Ujh;b1 = b¤
l;ss) = Pr(b2 = b¤
h;ssjh)Pr(Hjh;h)±(1 ¡ c) (23)






Pr(s2 = hjh;b2 = b¤
l;ss)¸¤(h;b¤
l;s;b¤
l;ss)Pr(Hjh;h)±(1 ¡ c) +




l;ss;a2;1 = wait) ¡ c
´o
:
Observe that Pr(Hjh;b2 = b¤
l;ss;a2;1 = wait) ¸ Pr(Hjh;l) = 1
2 > c. Observe also that if
b1 = b2 = b¤
l;ss in a strongly symmetric equilibrium either player one strictly prefers to drill at
time one, or she is indi®erent between her two time-one actions. This insight allows me to rewrite
the equation above as
E 1
2(Ujh;b¤
l;ss) = p ¡ c + Pr(b2 = b¤
h;ssjh)(± Pr(Ljh;h)c ¡ (1 ¡ ±)(Pr(Hjh;h) ¡ c)): (24)
It follows from the ¯rst paragraph of this step that E0(Ujh;b¤
h;ss;x ! 0) = 1
2(p ¡ c)(p ¡ c ¡
1
2(p¡c)): It follows from 24 that E0(Ujh;b¤





argmaxb1 b1(p ¡ c ¡ b1), as b¤
l;ss < b¤
h;ss and as b1(p ¡ c ¡ b1) is strictly concave it follows that
E0(Ujh;b¤
h;ss;x ! 0) > E0(Ujh;b¤
l;ss;x ! 0). It follows from 21 and from 24 that
E0(Ujh;b¤
l;ss;x ! 1) =
1
2
p(1 ¡ p)±(1 ¡ c)
¡
p ¡ c + ±(1 ¡ p)2c ¡ (1 ¡ ±)(p2(1 ¡ c)
¡(1 ¡ p)2c) ¡
1
2
p(1 ¡ p)±(1 ¡ c)
¶
:
It follows from the ¯rst paragraph of this step that
E0(Ujh;b¤







(p;c;±) j 1 ¡ p < c <
1
2
;± Pr(Ljh;h)c > (1 ¡ ±)(Pr(Hjh;h) ¡ c);
E0(Ujh;b¤




Observe that ­2 is non-empty. For example, (p;c;±) = (0:52;0:49;1) 2 ­2. As E0(Ujh, b¤
h;ss
; x ! 0) > E0(Ujh;b¤
l;ss;x ! 0), and as both expectations are continuous in x, it follows that
8(p;c;±) 2 ­2, 9 x 2 (0;1) such that E0(Ujh;b¤
l;ss;x) = E0(Ujh;b¤
h;ss;x):
Suppose s1 = h, that b1 = 2 fb¤
l;ss;b¤
h;ssg and that she won the tract. If r > b2, player one drills
her tract at time one. If r < b2 = b¤
l;ss, player two believes that player one is an optimist who will
drill at time one. From Proposition 3 we know that it is a best reply then for player one to drill
at time one. If r < b2 = b¤
h;ss, player two believes that player one possesses the same posterior as




± Pr(Ljh;h)c < 1. Hence,
player one is, at best, indi®erent between drilling and waiting and E 1





h;ss) = p¡c. As b¤
h;ss 2 argmaxb1 E0(Ujh;b1) = b1(p¡c¡b1), player one cannot
gain by setting b1 = 2 fb¤
l;ss;b¤
h;ssg.
Step 3: By contradiction, suppose that b¤
h;ss < b¤
l;ss. As an optimal bid is always equal to
1
2E 1
2(Uj¢), this implies that E 1
2(Ujh;b¤
h;ss) < E 1
2(Ujl;b¤
l;ss;x¤). However, mere inspection of 20
and 23 reveals that E 1
2(Ujl;b¤
l;ss;x¤) < E 1
2(Ujh;b¤
l;ss;x¤). Hence, E 1
2(Ujh;b¤
h;ss) < E 1
2(Ujh;b¤
l;ss;x¤).




l;ss ; x¤), and an optimist cannot be indi®erent be-
tween the two bids.
Proof of Proposition 7
Let E(Rjs) denote the expected revenue if players focus on the separating equilibrium. One has:
E(Rjs) = Pr(si = h)Pr(r < b¤
h;s)b¤












+Pr(si = l)Pr(r < b¤
l;ss)b¤
l;ss;
where E(Rjss) denotes the expected revenue if players focus on the semi-separating equilibrium.
Taking into account that Pr(si = h) = Pr(si = l) = 1
2 and that r » [0;1], one has:






















Suppose c is close to (but nonetheless strictly greater than) 0:4, ± is close to (but nonetheless
strictly less than) 1, and p = 0:6. As ± is close to one, it follows from proposition 4 that there exists
a separating equilibrium. It is also easy to check that (p;c;±) = (0:6;0:4+²;1¡²) 2 ­2 (see 25).
Thus (p;c;±) = (0:6;0:4+²;1¡²) also supports a semi-separating equilibrium in which optimists
bid b¤
l;ss with probability 1¡x. Furthermore, it can be checked that if (p;c;±) = (0:6;0:4+²;1¡²),
x¤ ' 0:72 and that inequality 26 boils down to 0:00211 > 0:00205, which is obviously satis¯ed.
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33Appendix B (Not for Publication)
Proof of Lemma 1
Observe that equation 1 can be rewritten as:
W(si;bi;b¡i) = Pr(Hjsi;b¡i)(1 ¡ c) ¡ (1 ¡ I)Pr(H;a¡i;1 = waitjsi;bi;b¡i)(1 ¡ c)
¡I Pr(L;a¡i;1 = waitjsi;bi;b¡i)c;
where I = 1 if Pr(Hjsi;b¡i;a¡i;1 = wait) ¸ c and I = 0 otherwise. The Lemma then follows
from the fact that Pr(¢;a¡i;1 = waitj¢) is decreasing in (¸(h;¢);¸(l;¢)).
Proof of Proposition 2
Suppose si = l. At time 1=2, player i computes Pr(Hjl;b¡i) · 1
2 < c, and there does not exist
a continuation equilibrium in which ¸¤(l;bi;b¡i) 6= 0. Suppose si = h and that b¡i = bl. As a
\low" bid can only come from a pessimist, Pr(Hjh;b¡i = bl) = 1
2 < c, and there does not exist
a continuation equilibrium in which ¸¤(h;bi;bl) 6= 0.
I now compute ¸¤(h;bh;bh). Suppose si = s¡i = h. ^ ¸(h;bh;bh) is de¯ned as a real number
with which player ¡i must drill to equate player i's gain of drilling (at time one) with her gain
of waiting. Formally, ^ ¸(h;bh;bh) is computed such that
Pr(Hjh;bh) ¡ c = ± Pr(s¡i = hjh;bh)^ ¸(h;bh;bh)Pr(Hjh;h)(1 ¡ c) (27)




p(1 ¡ p)x + p2(1 ¡ ^ ¸(h;bh;bh))




Suppose ^ ¸(h;bh;bh) < 1. Then, both players will only drill at time one with the same probability
if ¸¤(h;bh;bh) = ^ ¸(h;bh;bh). Suppose ^ ¸(h;bh;bh) > 1 (which is the case for su±ciently low values
of ±). Then player i prefers to drill at time one even if she knows that her neighbor will drill with
probability one. Thus, in any strongly symmetric equilibrium ¸¤(h;bh;bh) = minf1; ^ ¸(h;bh;bh)g.
I now show that there exists a unique value of ^ ¸(h;bh;bh) which satis¯es 27.
If Pr(Hjh;bh;a¡i;1 = wait) ¸ c, 27 boils down to Pr(Hjh;bh) ¡ c = ±(Pr(Hjh;bh) ¡ c) +
± Pr(L;s¡i = hjh;bh)^ ¸(h;bh;bh)c ´ RHS1. Denote by ¸1 the value of ^ ¸(¢) which equates the
LHS of the above equation with RHS1. Formally, ¸1 ´
(1¡±)(Pr(Hjh;bh)¡c)
± Pr(L;hjh;bh)c . If Pr(Hjh;a2;1 =
wait) < c, 27 boils down to
Pr(Hjh;bh) ¡ c = ± Pr(H;s¡i = hjh;bh)^ ¸(h;bh;bh)(1 ¡ c) ´ RHS2:




Observe that Pr(Hjh;bh;a2;1 = wait) is decreasing in ^ ¸(¢). Call ¸c the value of ^ ¸(¢) such that
Pr(Hjh;bh;a2;1 = wait) = c. Observe that ¸c < 1 , c > 1
2. If ^ ¸(¢) < ¸c, RHS1 is the relevant
right-hand side of equation 27. If ^ ¸(¢) > ¸c, RHS2 is the relevant right-hand side of equation






, (1 ¡ p)2c < p2(1 ¡ c) , Pr(hjh)[Pr(Hjh;h) ¡ c] > 0;
which is obviously satis¯ed.
I now show that ^ ¸(¢) = minf¸1;¸2g. Suppose ^ ¸(¢) = ¸2 and that ¸1 < ¸2. ^ ¸(¢) will only be
equal to ¸2 if
Pr(Hjh;bh;a¡i;1 = wait; ^ ¸(¢) = ¸2) < c , ¸2 > ¸c: (28)
As ¸1 < ¸2, and as 0 < @RHS1
@^ ¸(Pr(Hjh)) < @RHS2
@^ ¸(Pr(Hjh)), RHS1 will only be equal to RHS2 at a value
¸c > ¸2, which contradicts inequality 28. Using a similar reasoning, one can check that ^ ¸(¢)
cannot be equal to ¸1 when ¸2 < ¸1. If ^ ¸(¢) > 1, this means that player two cannot make player
one indi®erent between drilling and waiting (not even if she drills for sure if s2 = h) and in that
case player one strictly prefers to drill. Hence, ¸¤(h;bh;bh) = minf1;¸1;¸2g.
Proof of Proposition 3
The proof proceeds in two steps. First I compute ¸¤(h;bi;b¡i) under the assumption that
¸¤(l;bi;b¡i) = 0. Next, I take ¸¤(h;bi;b¡i) as given and show that it is a best reply for pessimists
to wait.
Step 1: Suppose si = h. There are then three di®erent cases: (i) (bi;b¡i) = (bh;bh), (ii) (bi;b¡i) =
(bl;bl) and (iii) (bi;b¡i) = (bl;bh).
Consider case (i). As only optimists bid bh, both players infer that their neighbor is an
optimist. This implies that Pr(Hjh;bh;a¡i;1 = wait) = Pr(Hjh;h) > c. Observe also that
both players possess identical private information and face identical histories. As players use
symmetric strategies, both of them drill at time one with the same probability. Player i is
indi®erent between drilling and waiting if
Pr(Hjh;h) ¡ c = ± Pr(H;a¡i;1 = drilljh;h)(1 ¡ c) + ± Pr(a¡i;1 = waitjh;h)(Pr(Hjh;h) ¡ c):
The equality above can be rewritten as ¸¤(h;bh;bh) =
(1¡±)(Pr(Hjh;h)¡c)
± Pr(Ljh;h)c ; which, by assumption,
is less than one.
Consider case (ii). Observe that Pr(Hjh;bl) ¸ Pr(Hjh;bl;a¡i;1 = wait) ¸ 1
2 > c. If s¡i = h,
both players possess identical private information and face identical histories. Hence, they drill
2at time one with the same probability. De¯ne ^ ¸(h;bl;bl) as a real number with which player ¡i
must drill (provided she is an optimist) to make player i indi®erent between drilling and waiting
(provided player i is an optimist). Formally,
Pr(Hjh;bl) ¡ c = ± Pr(H;a¡i;1 = drilljh;bl)(1 ¡ c) + ± Pr(a¡i;1 = waitjh;h)
£(Pr(Hjh;bl;a¡i;1 = wait) ¡ c):
The equality above can be rewritten as ^ ¸(h;bl;bl) =
(1¡±)(Pr(Hjh;bl)¡c)
± Pr(s¡i=hjh;bl)Pr(Ljh;h)c: If ^ ¸(h;bl;bl) > 1,
this means that, due to a low discount factor (or to a low Pr(s¡i = hjh;bl)), player i strictly
prefers to drill at time one despite the fact that player ¡i will drill with probability one if she
is an optimist. Hence, if ¸¤(h;bl;bl) is de¯ned as minf1; ^ ¸(h;bl;bl)g, player i cannot gain by
drilling at time one with a di®erent probability.
Consider case (iii). I show that ¸(h;bl;bh) = 0 and ¸(h;bh;bl) = 1 constitutes an equilibrium
in the continuation game. As b¡i = bh, player i knows that s¡i = h. Suppose player i expects
player ¡i to drill at time one with probability one. Player i prefers to wait if ± Pr(Hjh;h)(1¡c) >
Pr(Hjh;h) ¡ c. Rewriting the inequality above yields ± Pr(Ljh;h)c > (1 ¡ ±)(Pr(Hjh;h) ¡ c),
which, by assumption, is satis¯ed. Player ¡i expects player i to wait with probability one. As
Pr(Hjh;bl) ¸ 1
2 > c, and as ± < 1, it is a best reply for her to drill at time one with probability
one.
Step 2: Suppose si = l. There are then two di®erent cases: either b¡i = bl or b¡i = bh. If b¡i = bl,
player i computes Pr(Hjl;bl) · Pr(Hjl) < c and she strictly prefers to wait. If b¡i = bh, player
i computes Pr(Hjl;bh) = Pr(Hjl;h) = 1
2, which is greater than c. As x < 1, player ¡i computes
Pr(Hjh;bl) > 1
2 = player i's posterior. As both players possess di®erent posteriors, they do not











By assumption (1¡±)(Pr(Hjh;h)¡c) < ± Pr(Ljh;h)c. As (1¡±)(1
2 ¡c) < (1¡±)(Pr(Hjh;h)¡c)
and as ± Pr(Ljh;h)c < ± 1
2c, I conclude that inequality 29 holds. Thus, in this continuation
equilibrium a pessimist always waits with probability one.
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